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Abstract. This paper is a comprehensive study of the unconventional monetary policy 
taken by the Federal Reserve since the financial crisis of 2008, specifically on the purchases 
of different assets by the Fed to change medium and long-term rates.  Included in this study 
are the three rounds of quantitative easing, and the two rounds of Operation Twist. A study 
as such is needed in order to examine if the Fed’s purchases of these various long-term 
assets had any effect on the financial markets in the longer term perspective since the first 
announcement of the first round of purchase in November 2008. While there exists a 
variety of literature on the effects of quantitative easing on Treasuries and mortgage backed 
securities, there is no single study comprising of all the large scale asset purchases by the 
Fed, covering their effects on all major financial assets. This study is an attempt to fill this 
void in current literature on quantitative easing. 
Keywords. Unconventional Monetary Policy, Quantitative Easing, the Federal Reserve. 
JEL. E52, E58, G14. 
 
1. Introduction 
.1.  Unconventional Monetary Policy Since 2008 
The Federal Reserve has been very visibly pursuing unconventional 
monetary policy since the 2008 financial crisis, particularly the large-scale 
asset purchases (LSAPs) of long-term securities including Treasuries, Agency 
bonds and mortgage-backed securities (MBS). The purchases of these securities are 
called quantitative easing (QE), for the purpose of reducing medium and long-term 
interest rates to stimulate economic activity. Quantitative easing has been 
considered unconventional since the conventional monetary policy taken by the 
Fed before the financial crisis was to target the short-term fed funds rate.  
However, the Fed exhausted its conventional monetary influence during the time of 
crisis when the fed funds rate reached its lower bound of zero, and unusually 
aggressive monetary stance was needed in order to prevent financial conditions 
from worsening. 
The Federal Reserve initiated several measures to alleviate the deteriorating 
financial condition, stabilize the financial system, and reduce the damaging impacts 
of the recession. They included large-scale purchasing of financial assets, 
providing short-term secured loans to financial institutions, facilitating loans to 
institutions with commercial papers, lowering the discount rate to zero, and paying 
interest to banks for their required reserves. Yet another strategy is to manage 
market expectations of impending Fed actions via communications to the public 
about its policy stances and economic goals. 
The large-scale asset purchases, or quantitative easing, have been the focus of 
scrutiny of Fed policies since the 2008 financial crisis to the present time, because 
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while the financial crisis had passed, the subsequent effects of the recession and the 
weak employment market have lingered, and the Fed is still engaging in 
quantitative easing in order to prevent possible economic downturn. Subsequent to 
the announcement of the first round of quantitative easing on November 28, 2008, 
there have been three more rounds of large-scale asset purchases in August 2010, 
September 2012, and December 2012. 
1.2.  The Three Rounds of Quantitative Easing 
The first quantitative easing was announced on November 25, 2008, that the 
Fed would purchase $500 billion in mortgage-backed securities and up to $100 
billion in agency debt of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae, and Federal Home 
Loan Banks.  Furthermore, in March 2009, the Fed expanded the mortgage buying 
program with additional purchase of $750 billion more in mortgage-backed 
securities.  Overall, when this first round of LSAP ended on March 31, 2010, it 
purchased a total of $1.25 trillion in mortgage-back securities and $175 billion in 
agency debt.  The main purpose of this action was ―to reduce the cost and increase 
the availability of credit for the purchase of houses, which in turn should support 
housing markets and foster improved conditions in financial markets more 
generally.‖1 
The second quantitative easing was announced on August 10, 2010 Federal 
Open Market Committee ―will keep constant the Federal Reserve’s holdings of 
securities at their current level by reinvesting principal payments from agency debt 
and agency mortgage-backed securities in longer-term Treasury securities.‖  
Additionally, the Fed started purchasing $600 billion of longer-term securities. It 
was intended to promote a stronger pace of economic recovery. 
The third quantitative easing was announced on September 13, 2012 that the 
Fed was committing to an open-ended purchase of $40 billion in agency MBS per 
month until the labor market improves substantially. On December 12, 2012, the 
Fed decided to continue and magnify the attempt of the third round of quantitative 
easing by increasing the amount of open-ended purchase from $40 billion to $85 
billion per month.  This third round of purchase is still an ongoing process as of the 
writing of this paper. 
To further strengthen the economy and to prevent the recovery from losing its 
momentum, the Fed also tried to influence the yield curve by selling short-term 
Treasuries and using the proceeds to purchase longer-term Treasuries in what is 
conventionally called Operation Twist (OT). The FOMC announced the first round 
of Operation Twist on September 21, 2011 with the intention of purchasing $400 
billion of bonds with maturities of 6 to 30 years and to sell bonds with maturities of 
less than 3 years, thereby extending the average maturity of the Fed’s own 
portfolio. The second round of Operation Twist was announced on June 20, 2012, 
extending the first program with additional $267 billion in purchase, and 
prolonging the program through December 2012. Figures1 Panels A – C on the 
following three pages illustrate and summarize representations of major financial 
markets – the stock market, Treasuries market, and the foreign exchange market – 
a month before and after notable LSAP announcements by the Fed. As depicted in 
the figures, major financial markets reacted significantly to significant Fed 
announcements on asset purchases. 
 
 
 
 
 
1Federal Reserve Press Release on November 25, 2008 at 8:15 a.m. EST. 
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Figure 1. Panel A. Responses of SPY Prices on QE Announcement 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Panel B. Responses of 10-Year Treasury Yields on QE Announcements 
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Figure 1. Panel C. Responses of $/EURO on QE Announcements 
 
1.3.  Outline of the Chapter 
This paper is a comprehensive study of the unconventional monetary policy 
taken by the Fed since the financial crisis, specifically on the purchases of different 
assets by the Fed to change medium and long-term rates.  Included in this study are 
the three rounds quantitative easing, and the two rounds of Operation Twist.  A 
study as such is needed in order to examine whether the Fed’s purchases of these 
various long-term assets had any effect on the financial markets in the longer term 
perspective since the first announcement of such LSAP in November 2008.  While 
there exists a variety of literature on the effects of quantitative easing on Treasuries 
and mortgage backed securities, there is no single study comprising of all the 
LSAPs by the Fed, covering the effects of all of these LSAPs on all major financial 
assets.  Figure 1 illustrate price and yield movements of the equity, fixed-income, 
and currency markets before and after for some notable QE announcement dates. 
A complete and thorough study on the effects of these LSAPs on all sectors of 
the financial market is necessary since these monetary easings by the Fed not only 
affect the yields for Treasuries and mortgage-backed securities, but also prices and 
yields of other types of financial assets.  Bernanke & Reinhart (2004) maintain that 
the pricing of financial assets such as equities and mortgages depends partly on the 
entire expected future path of short-term interest rates, as well as the current short-
term interest rate.  A central bank can then affect asset prices and economic activity 
by guiding market expectations of future short-term rates. Recent literature, i.e. 
Svensson (2001), Eggertsson & Woodford (2003), suggests that additional 
monetary stimulus such as quantitative easing can be introduced together with 
some form of commitment to the public to keep short-term interest rate low for a 
prolonged period of time, even after when the economy shows some sign of 
recovering. This commitment should lower yields via the term structure component 
of bonds and support other asset prices, provided that the commitment is a credible 
one.  
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Since each of these LSAPs are different, and occurred under different economic 
circumstances, they should have different impacts on the economy.  Krishnamurthy 
& Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) conclude that effects of QE on particular assets 
depend on which assets are being purchased by the Fed, and find that it is 
inappropriate to focus solely on a policy target, such as Treasury rates, since QEs 
have different effects on different assets via several channels, such as a prepayment 
channel for MBS. 
Gagnon et al (2010) present evidence that the purchases led to economically 
meaningful and long lasting declines on treasuries, agency bonds, mortgage backed 
securities, Treasury inflation protected securities (TIPS), SWAPS, and corporate 
bonds.  However, many such studies only include the fixed-income sector.  By 
lowering Treasury and MBS yields, the effects of these LSAPs also potentially 
spilled over to the broad financial market since stocks and other financial assets are 
influenced by the Fed’s current actions and expectations on its future monetary 
policy stance. 
By conducting an event-study on the major LSAP announcement dates since 
November 2008 to August 2014 (the date of this writing) on all the major financial 
assets, this paper identifies the effects of the Fed’s purchases throughout the 
economy, and compares the effectiveness of all these large scale asset purchases 
since the 2008 financial crisis.  This paper fills the void of current literature and 
provides a complete picture of the Fed’s asset purchases since the 2008 financial 
crisis.   
The paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 is a survey of current literature on 
the impact of quantitative easing on different financial assets.  Section 3 describes 
the data, model, and methodology.  Section 4 discusses the empirical results, and 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1. The Portfolio Balance Channel and Signaling Channel of 
Quantitative Easing 
A vast literature exists on using the event-study approach to observe the effects 
of the recent large scale asset purchases on different financial assets, as central 
banks of Japan, England, Europe, and the United States initiate and continue 
purchases of financial assets to support the economy since the 2008 financial crisis. 
Even before the financial crisis, the Fed has been studying alternative monetary 
policy given the zero-bound constraint of the Fed Funds rate. Using the standard 
method to decompose yields on safe long-term government bonds, the predominant 
observation is that there are two channels that a central bank’s purchasing program 
can work through to impact broader market bond yields and other types of interest 
rates: the portfolio balance channel and the signaling channel. The portfolio 
balance channel emerges from a central bank’s large purchases of long-term bonds, 
thereby decreasing the supply in private-sector portfolios and reducing the term 
premium. The signaling channel occurs via the central bank’s announcements of 
such large-scale asset purchases, where it influences market participants to 
expectation that future short-term interest rates will be kept very low for a 
prolonged period of time, even as the economy show signs of recovery. 
The existing literature considers the portfolio balance channel to be the key 
channel of how a central bank’s large-scale asset purchase works through to impact 
interest rates.  In his speech on August 27, 2010, the Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke 
described this channel as follows: 
―The channels through which the Fed's purchases affect longer-term interest 
rates and financial conditions more generally have been subject to debate. I 
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see the evidence as most favorable to the view that such purchases work 
primarily through the so-called portfolio balance channel, which holds that 
once short-term interest rates have reached zero, the Federal Reserve's 
purchases of longer-term securities affect financial conditions by changing 
the quantity and mix of financial assets held by the public. Specifically, the 
Fed's strategy relies on the presumption that different financial assets are not 
perfect substitutes in investors' portfolios, so that changes in the net supply of 
an asset available to investors affect its yield and those of broadly similar 
assets. Thus, our purchases of Treasury, agency debt, and agency MBS likely 
both reduced the yields on those securities and also pushed investors into 
holding other assets with similar characteristics, such as credit risk and 
duration. For example, some investors who sold MBS to the Fed may have 
replaced them in their portfolios with longer-term, high-quality corporate 
bonds, depressing the yields on those assets as well. The logic of the portfolio 
balance channel implies that the degree of accommodation delivered by the 
Federal Reserve's securities purchase program is determined primarily by the 
quantity and mix of securities the central bank holds or is anticipated to hold 
at a point in time (the "stock view"), rather than by the current pace of new 
purchases (the "flow view"). In support of the stock view, the cessation of the 
Federal Reserve's purchases of agency securities at the end of the first quarter 
of this year seems to have had only negligible effects on longer-term rates 
and spreads.‖2 
Daniel L. Thornton, Vice President and Economic Advisor at the Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis, presents several reasons to be skeptical of the 
theoretical foundations of the portfolio balance channel, and presents empirical 
results that show little evidence of a statistically significant portfolio balance 
channel and no evidence of an economically meaningful effect (Thornton, 2012).  
However, his work focuses more on the longer-term effects of QE, and uses less 
frequent monthly data. 
2.2.  Literature on the Fed’s Asset Purchases Before and After the 2008 
Financial Crisis 
Clouse et al (2000) explore scenarios where the nominal Treasury-bill rate is 
assumed to be zero. They consider the effectiveness of further open market 
purchases of Treasuries to stimulate the economy via managing expectations of the 
future paths of short-term interest rates, inflation, and asset prices. They also 
examine alternative monetary policies available for the Fed to deploy in theory 
when the nominal short-term interest rate is zero. These possible policy tools 
include open market purchases of Treasury bonds, discount window lending, and 
use of options. 
In the case of the Fed conducting open market purchase of Treasury bills when 
this asset’s yield reaches zero, the private-sector considers Treasury bills and the 
monetary base as perfect substitutes.  As such, open market purchases of Treasury 
bills do not change Treasury-bill rates since the initial portfolio is not in 
disequilibrium. Additionally, such purchases have no direct effect on the public 
wealth as there are no longer any potential capital gains since the Treasury bill rate 
cannot be reduced any further.  However, this supposition does not consider the 
case of the Treasury bill rate being negative, as it did when the 3-month T-bill 
dipped below zero on December 9, 2008, and the one-month T-bill has yielded as 
low as -0.03% on August 4, 2011. 
In the case of the Fed purchasing assets other than Treasuries, even if these 
assets are perfect substitutes for Treasuries, quantitative easing could have an 
impact on the economy through a ―signaling effect.‖ This effect leads market 
 
2http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20100827a.htm 
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participants to lower their expectations for future short-term interest rates, and 
possibly lengthening the expected duration of very low or zero target Fed Funds 
rate.  Clouse et al conclude that aside from the signaling effect, the impact of asset 
purchases by the Fed depends on whether the assets purchased are imperfect 
substitutes for the monetary base and Treasuries. If the assets purchased are 
imperfect substitutes, then purchasing these assets can have an impact through their 
supply in the market.  Furthermore, very large open market purchases of domestic 
and foreign government bonds might well lower domestic bond yield and cause the 
home currency to depreciate, but the likely size of these effects is unknown.   
Bernanke, Reinhart, & Sack (2004) apply the tools of modern empirical finance 
to the present experiences of the United States and Japan.  They examine possible 
effectiveness of different nonstandard monetary tools when the conventional 
monetary tool of targeting Fed Funds rate is near the zero bound. Policy 
alternatives, other than the fed funds rate, are grouped into three classes: (1) using 
communications policies to shape public expectations about the future direction of 
interest rates; (2) quantitative easing, or increasing the size of the central bank’s 
balance sheet: and (3) changing the composition of the central bank’s balance 
sheet, e.g. selling its holding of shorter-term bonds in exchange for longer-term 
bonds in order to lower longer-term interest rates
3
. Bernanke, Reinhart, & Sack 
employ two approaches in order to garner new evidence concerning the 
effectiveness of unconventional monetary policy tools.  First, by utilizing an event-
study approach, they measure and analyze the behavior of selected asset prices and 
yields over a short period of time surrounding central bank new releases and 
statement, or other types of financial or economic news. The event studies confirm 
that FOMC statements do have important impacts on private sector policy 
expectations, both directly and indirectly. This finding leads to the suggestion that 
the FOMC does have some capacity to influence yields and prices of longer-term 
assets by using communications policies. 
Second, Bernanke, Reinhart, and Sack estimate ―no-arbitrage‖ models of the 
term structure for the United States and Japan so as to allow for the prediction of 
interest rates at all maturities. The predicted term structure then is used as a 
benchmark to assess whether factors not included in the model have any effects on 
interest rates, such as a large scale asset purchase by a central bank. Moreover, they 
find some evidence that suggests the relative supplies of securities matter for yields 
for U.S. bonds, and that this is a necessary condition for achieving the desired 
effects from targeted asset purchases. They conclude that unconventional monetary 
policies do appear to affect asset prices and yields, and consequently, aggregate 
demand. 
Swanson (2011) undertakes a modern event-study analysis of the 1961 
Operation Twist and uses its estimated effects to assess what should be expected 
for QE2. The paper presents evidence that the 1961 Operation Twist and the 
second round of quantitative easing in 2010 are similar in magnitude. The author 
concludes that with high statistical significance, the cumulative effect of the six 
major announcements of Operation Twist amounts to about 15 basis points. The 
effects of Operations Twist on long-term agency and corporate bond yields are 
smaller but also statistically significant. The evidence indicates that Operation 
Twist has a larger impact on Treasury securities, and its effect is weaker on private 
sector credit instruments. 
 
3 This is often referred to as Operation Twist, since the central bank is attempting to ―twist‖ the shape 
of the yield curve with the combined actions of selling shorter-term bonds and purchasing longer-term 
bonds. 
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Gagnon et al (2010) explains how the Fed implemented the first quantitative 
easing in 2008, and discusses the channels through which they can affect the 
economy. The paper concludes that the Fed’s purchases were effective in lowering 
longer-term private borrowing rates and in stimulating the ailing economy. The 
evidence suggests that the impacts of the Fed’s actions are widespread throughout 
the different securities studied in the paper, including Treasuries, corporate bonds, 
and interest-rate swaps. The impact is the most pronounced in the mortgage 
market, thus achieving the Fed’s primary intention of supporting economic activity, 
especially the housing market at that time. 
Gagnon et al find that the primary channel through which QE1 appears to work 
is the risk premium on the asset being purchased, by bidding up the price of the 
asset being purchased and thus lowering its yield. This process, which applies to 
only longer-term yields, is commonly known as the portfolio balance effect. The 
portfolio balance effect can be decomposed into two components: the average level 
of short-term risk-free interest rates expected over the term to maturity of the asset, 
and the risk premium. The authors acknowledge that in theory, the effects of QE1 
could result from changing either of these two components.  However, they believe 
that the Fed has not been using quantitative easing as a signal that the future path of 
short-term risk-free interest rates would remain low. They find that neither the 
language about future policy rates in the FOMC statements nor the LSAP 
announcements appear to have had a substantial effect on the expected future 
federal funds rate. Therefore, they conclude that any decrease in longer-term yields 
as a result of the Fed’s LSAP has likely come through in the form of narrowing risk 
premiums.  Additionally, they find that since the most important part of the risk 
premium for Treasury securities is referred to as the ―term premium,‖ the LSAPs 
have also lowered the duration risk in the financial market in general.  Thus, the 
LSAPs have caused the decrease of duration risk and the term premium across all 
asset classes. 
Krishnamurthy & Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) evaluate the effects of QE1 and 
QE2 on interest rates using an event-study methodology. They feel that it is 
inappropriate to focus only on Treasury rates as a policy target since QE works 
through several channels to affect specific asset differently, since there are several 
channels of how the Fed’s purchases work through the economy to impact different 
assets in different ways. One of their main findings is that the large reductions in 
mortgage rates after QE1 can be attributed to the large purchases of agency MBS, 
thereby reducing the price of mortgage-specific risk. However, for QE2, which 
involved only Treasury purchases, the impact on treasury and Agency bond rates 
are substantial, but not so much on MBS and corporate bond rates. Moreover, they 
find a significant reduction in the default risk/default risk premium for corporate 
bonds only for QE1, but not QE2, which suggests that the MBS purchases initiated 
during QE1 may also have facilitated the lowering of corporate credit risk and thus 
corporate bond yield. 
The paper details and examines the seven channels through which quantitative 
easing may be expected to affect different financial assets, and mentions the 
Eggertson & Woodford (2003) finding that via a signaling channel, non-traditional 
monetary policy can have an effect in lowering long-term bond yields. But this 
signaling channel can work only if the policy is a credible commitment by the 
central bank in keeping the interest rate low for an extended period of time, even 
after the economy recovers. Clouse et al (2000) recommend the central bank to 
purchase a large quantity of long-term assets to show commitment. With the 
expectations hypothesis, this signaling channel affects all interest rates. 
Another noteworthy channel that QE works through is duration risk, which 
comes from the term premium of bonds. It reflects the reluctance of investors to 
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bear interest risk with longer-term bonds, thus longer duration bonds carry a term 
premium—the additional return that investors require from a bond with fixed long-
term yield, beyond the average of expected future short-term interest rates. 
By purchasing long-term securities, monetary policy can decrease duration risk 
and reduce longer-term bond yields relative to shorter-term bond yields.  
Furthermore, there is a liquidity channel, where QE increases liquidity for long-
term securities and decreases the premium yield investors pay for shorter-term, 
more liquid bonds. 
In order to examine how QE affects different interest rates via these different 
channels, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen use the difference-in-difference 
approach supplemented with information from derivatives as their main empirical 
methodology. Financial assets in their study include long-term Agency bond yields, 
long-term treasury bond yields,  MBS yields, corporate bond yields, TIPS, federal 
funds futures contracts, the CDS swap rates, the inflation swap rates, and the 
implied volatility on interest rate options. Their main conclusions are that the 
Federal Reserve’s purchase of long-term bonds during QE1 and QE2 significantly 
lowered nominal interest rates on Treasuries, Agencies, corporate bonds, and MBS, 
but these effects are not of the same magnitudes across different types of bonds, 
maturities, and Fed purchase programs.  One of the primary channels that both QEs 
work through is a signaling channel which drives down the yield on all bonds, with 
stronger effects on intermediate bonds rather than longer termed bonds. Further, 
the authors decompose the portfolio balance effect/channel so as to pinpoint the 
specifics of how QE works through this channel to affect interest rates. The authors 
quote Brian Sack, the head of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s Open 
Market desk, when discussing how the portfolio balance channel can work in a 
large-scale asset purchase by the Fed
4
: 
―The purchases bid up the price of the asset and hence lower its yields.  
These effects would be expected to spill over into other assets that are similar 
in nature, to the extent that investors are willing to substitute between the 
assets.  These patterns describe what researchers often refer to as the portfolio 
balance channel.‖ 
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen conclude that one portfolio balance 
channel that is prominent in both QE1 and QE2 is the safety channel affecting safe 
long and medium-term bonds with low default risks. This safety channel highlights 
the substitutability of assets within a class with low-default risks. 
Another element in the portfolio-balance channel is the duration-risk channel.  
Brian Sack spoke of this particular channel in a later speech
5
: 
―The effects of the asset purchase programs are thought to arise from the 
amount of duration risk that they remove from the portfolios of private 
investors.  By removing duration risk, the Federal Reserve puts downward 
pressure on the longer-term real interest rates, which in turn pulls down 
private borrowing costs and makes broader financial conditions more 
supportive of growth. Duration risk can be measured in a variety of ways, but 
one common measure for a securities portfolio is ten-year equivalents, or the 
amount of 10-year Treasury notes that an investor would have to buy to be 
exposed to the same amount of duration risk contained in the portfolio.  Some 
of the staff work that calibrates the economic impact of the Federal Reserve’s 
balance sheet policies assumes that the effects on yields and financial 
conditions are driven by the amount of ten-year equivalents that the Fed takes 
into its portfolio.‖ 
 
4http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2009/sac091202.html 
5 http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2011/sac111024.html 
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While the Fed believes that duration risk channel is the main proponent of how 
QE works, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen do not find support for the 
presence of duration-risk channel in either QE1 or QE2. 
Stroebel and Taylor (2012) examine the quantitative impact of the Fed’s 
purchase of mortgage-backed securities during the financial crisis on mortgage 
interest rate spreads.  They use a multivariate statistical framework and take into 
account other possible influences on spreads, while controlling for two other 
possible influences on mortgage spread, namely changes in prepayment and default 
risk. Their empirical results assign a considerable portion of the decline in 
mortgage rates to prepayment and default risks, and a relatively small and 
uncertain portion to the Fed’s asset purchasing program. For instances where the 
existence or announcement of the quantitative easing seems likely to have 
decreased spreads, their results show no separate effect of the Fed’s purchases.  
Additionally, they show that the estimated size of the impact of the Fed’s MBS 
purchase on mortgage spreads can be traced to a shift in the spread between 
Treasuries and swaps at the time of the panic in October 2008. However, this paper 
does not address the issue that if the MBS purchase by the Fed lowered the spread 
between Treasuries and swaps, then there is a possibility that the Fed’s purchase 
has spillover effects on other financial assets. 
In light of the survey of literature, numerous questions have emerged that 
haven’t been answered fully, which this paper attempts to accomplish.  They 
include: 
 Did the QEs decrease yields on all long-term nominal assets, including 
Treasuries, Agency bonds, corporate bonds, and MBS? 
 Were the effects of QE larger for longer duration assets? 
 Which round of QE was more effective? 
 Did QE raises yields on the most liquid assets such as Treasuries, relative 
to other less liquid assets. 
 Did QEs involving the purchase of Treasuries and agencies lower the 
yields on very safe assets such as treasuries, Agencies, and possible high-grade 
bonds, relative to less safe assets such as lower-grade corporate bonds or bonds 
with prepayment risk such as MBS? 
 Did QE affect only fixed income assets, or were there spillover effects into 
other types of financial assets? 
Did QE depreciate the home currency? 
 
3. Model, Dates, and Methodology 
3.1.  Relevant Event Dates 
Following Gagnon et al (2010) and Krishnamurthy & Vissing-Jorgensen 
(2011), this paper utilizes an event-study approach to examine the impact of all of 
the recent large-scale asset purchases based on announcements from the Fed of 
such purchases, spanning from the first announcement of QE1 on November 25, 
2008 to the latest QE on December 12, 2012.  Including in this study are the three 
rounds of QE and two rounds of Operation Twist, spanning from the month before 
QE1 to one month after the latest announcement of QE3 tapering, October 1, 2008 
to August 31, 2014. The following is a brief description of somenotable 
announcement dates included in this study: 
QE1: 
 November 25, 2008 – The initial LSAP announcement in which the 
Federal Reserve announced it would purchase up to $100 billion in agency debt, 
and up to $500 billion in agency MBS. 
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 December 1, 2008 – Chairman Bernanke gave a speech at the Greater 
Austin Chamber of Commerce, Austin Texas.  He reiterated the Fed’s purchasing 
plan over the next few quarters 
 December 16, 2008 – FOMC statement repeating the previous 
announcement that the Fed would purchase large quantities of agency debt and 
mortgage-backed securities to provide support to the mortgage and housing 
markets, and stood ready to expand purchase of agency debt and MBS as 
conditions warrant. It also announced that the Committee is evaluating the potential 
benefits of purchasing longer-term Treasury securities. 
 January 28, 2009 – FOMC statement reiterating the Fed’s purchasing plan. 
 March 18, 2009 – FOMC statement repeating the Fed’s continuing support 
to mortgage lending and housing markets by increasing the size of the Fed’s 
balance sheet further by purchasing up to an additional $750 billion of agency 
MBS, bring its total purchases of these securities to up to $1.25 trillion in 2009. 
Moreover, the Fed announced increasing its purchase of agency debt that year by 
up to $100 billion to a total of up to $200 billion. Additionally, to help improve 
conditions in the private credit markets, the Committee decided to purchase up to 
$300 billion of longer-term Treasury securities over the next six months. 
QE2: 
 August 10, 2010 – FOMC statement announcing that ―the Committee will 
keep constant the Federal Reserve’s holdings of securities at their current level by 
reinvesting principal payments from agency debt and agency MBS in longer-term 
Treasury securities.‖ 
 September 21, 2010 – FOMC statement announcing that the Fed would 
continue to maintain its existing policy of reinvesting principal payments from its 
securities holdings. 
 November 3, 2010 – FOMC statement announcing its intent to promote a 
stronger pace of economic recovery by maintaining its existing policy of 
reinvesting principal payments from its securities holdings.  In addition, the 
Committee planned to purchase a further $600 billion of longer-term Treasury 
securities by the end of the second quarter of 2011, at a pace of $75 billion per 
month. 
QE 3: 
 September 13, 2012 – FOMC announced an open-ended commitment to 
purchase $40 billion agency MBS per month until the labor market improves 
substantially. 
 December 12, 2012 – FOMC statement to increase the amount of open-
ended purchase from $40 billion to $85 billion per month. 
 September 18, 2013 – FOMC statement to continue purchasing additional 
agency MBS at a pace of $40 per month and longer-term Treasury securities at a 
pace of $45 billion per month.  This announcement is significant because the Fed 
changed its language on its press release regarding the nature of it asset purchasing 
program. Since December 12, 2012, its press releases included the following two 
paragraphs: 
To support a stronger economic recovery and to help ensure that inflation, 
over time, is at the rate most consistent with its dual mandate, the 
Committee will continue purchasing additional agency mortgage-backed 
securities at a pace of $40 billion per month. The Committee also will 
purchase longer-term Treasury securities after its program to extend the 
average maturity of its holdings of Treasury securities is completed at the 
end of the year, initially at a pace of $45 billion per month. The Committee 
is maintaining its existing policy of reinvesting principal payments from its 
holdings of agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities in agency 
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mortgage-backed securities and, in January, will resume rolling over 
maturing Treasury securities at auction. Taken together, these actions 
should maintain downward pressure on longer-term interest rates, support 
mortgage markets, and help to make broader financial conditions more 
accommodative. The Committee will closely monitor incoming information 
on economic and financial developments in coming months. If the outlook 
for the labor market does not improve substantially, the Committee will 
continue its purchases of Treasury and agency mortgage-backed securities, 
and employ its other policy tools as appropriate, until such improvement is 
achieved in a context of price stability. In determining the size, pace, and 
composition of its asset purchases, the Committee will, as always, take 
appropriate account of the likely efficacy and costs of such purchases. 6 
On September 18, 2013, it changed its language in the first paragraph regarding 
its asset purchasing program to the following: 
Taking into account the extent of federal fiscal retrenchment, the 
Committee sees the improvement in economic activity and labor market 
conditions since it began its asset purchase program a year ago as 
consistent with growing underlying strength in the broader economy.  
However, the Committee decided to await more evidence that progress will 
be sustained before adjusting the pace of its purchases.  Accordingly, the 
Committee decided to continue purchasing additional agency mortgage-
backed securities at a pace of $40 billion per month and longer-term 
Treasury securities at a pace of $45 billion per month.7 
Tapering: 
 May 22, 2013 –Chairman Ben S. Bernanke Testimony Before the Joint 
Economic Committee, U.S. Congress, Washington, D.C., signaling the withdrawal 
of QE3 for the first time. 
 December 18, 2013 – FOMC statement to begin tapering of QE3, at a pace 
of $35 billion per month rather than $40 billion per month, and will add to its 
holdings of longer-term Treasury securities at a pace of $40 billion per month 
rather than $45 billion per month 
Operation Twist (First Round) 
 September 21, 2011 – FOMC statement announcing the purchase of $400 
billion of bonds with maturities of 6 to 30 years and to sell bonds with maturities of 
less than 3 years, thereby extending the average maturity of the Fed’s own portfolio. 
Operation Twist (Second Round) 
 June 20, 2012 –FOMC announced an extension to the Twist Program by 
additional $267 billion and extending the program through December 2012. 
For the announcement dates in QE1 and QE2, this paper uses the five dates 
selected by Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011), but also included other 
QE announcement dates from FOMC up to the most recent time. Krishnamurthy 
and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) remark on the identification issue for these five QE1 
event dates that there is some uncertainty that the identified events are in fact the 
dominant events for the identified event day. This is due to the possibility that 
other newsworthy economic news arriving through this period and potentially 
creating measurement error problems for their event study. To remedy such 
potential problem for this paper, a thorough review on major newswires, including 
Dow Jones and Reuters, is conducted in order to ascertain that no other major 
economic news announcements were released on that date, and that there were no 
leaks of the Fed’s decision on QEs prior to the announcement dates. 
Krishnamurthy & Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) also raise the issue of omitted event 
dates and how that would affect their event study.  They comment that while there 
 
6December 12, 2012 FOMC Statement. 
7September 18, 2013 FOMC Statement. 
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is a possibility of other ―true‖ event dates being excluded from their study, 
potentially reducing the power of tests by increasing the noise in the sample.  
Nonetheless, this exclusion of other event dates does not result in any biases. 
Furthermore, this paper includes more event dates than in literature, since a 
study on the impact of QE cannot be complete or unbiased if it only contained 
hand-selected dates that affected financial asset prices more than the other 
announcement dates as in the other studies.  As such, besides running a baseline 
regression using the event dates from Krishnamurthy & Vissing-Jorgensen (2011), 
I also performed a robustness check, included all FOMC announcements regarding 
QE, not just the select, earlier ones that had more impact on the market.  Table 1 on 
the following page is the list of event dates for robustness check. 
 
Table 1. List of Event Dates for Robustness Check 
QE1 QE2 QE3 QE3 Tapering OT1 OT2 
November 25, 
2008 
August 10, 
2010 
September 
13, 2012 
May 22, 2013 September 
21, 2011 
June 20, 2012 
December 1, 
2008 
September 
21, 2010 
October 24, 
2012 
December 18, 
2013 
  
December 16, 
2008 
November 3, 
2010 
December 12, 
2012 
January 29, 
2013 
  
December 30, 
2008 
December 14, 
2010 
January 30, 
2013 
March 19, 
2014 
  
January 28, 
2009 
January 26, 
2011 
March 20, 
2013 
April 30, 
2014 
  
March 18, 
2009 
March 15, 
2011 
May 1, 2013 June 18, 2014   
April 29, 
2009 
April 27, 
2011 
June 19, 2013 July 30, 2014   
June 24, 2009 June 22, 2011 July 31, 2013    
August 12, 
2009 
 September 
18, 2013 
   
September 
23, 2009 
 October 30, 
2013 
   
November 4, 
2009 
     
December 16, 
2009 
     
January 27, 
2010 
     
March 16, 
2010 
     
 
3.2. Data Description 
This study is a comprehensive study on the effects of quantitative easing on all 
major asset classes in the financial markets, including equity, fixed-income, and 
foreign exchange, by using daily asset returns/yields for all the assets included in 
the study.  Following Hasbrouk (2003) and Wang, Yang, & Wu (2006), exchange-
traded funds (ETFs) are used to measure equity and gold returns instead of broad 
market indices as the use of ETFs reveals new findings on the impact of monetary 
policy news on asset prices.  This is because ETFs are regularly and continuously 
traded, and circumvent the nonsynchronous trading problem of market indexes.  
Therefore, ETFs more closely mimics real time trading behavior of other financial 
assets than that of cash market indexes.  The following is the list of assets included 
in this study: 
1. SPY – The SPDR® S&P 500® ETF – the exchange traded fund that seeks to 
provide investment results, before expenses, corresponding generally to the price and 
yield performance of the S&P 500® Index. 
2. MDY – The SPDR® S&P MIDCAP 400® ETF -- the exchange traded fund that 
Journal of Economics Bibliography 
JEB,2(3), J. Guo. p.76-105. 
89 
seeks to provide investment results, before expenses, corresponding generally to the 
price and yield performance of the S&P®MidCap 400®IndexTM. 
3. IWM – iShares Russell 2000 ETF – the exchange traded fund that seeks to 
provide investment results, before expenses, corresponding generally to the price and 
yield performance of the S&P®MidCap 400®IndexTM. 
4. GLD -- The SPDR® Gold Shares ETF – the exchange traded fund that seeks to 
mimic the performance of the price of gold bullion, less expenses. 
5. Euro per dollar EUR 
6. British pound per dollar GBP 
7. Japanese yen per dollar YEN 
8. Swiss franc per dollar CHF 
9. One-year treasury bill 
10. Three-year treasury note 
11. Five-year treasury note 
12. Ten-year treasury note 
13. Thirty-year treasury bond 
14. Moody’s corporate bonds rated Aaa 
15. Moody’s corporate bonds rated Baa  
16. One-year interest rate swap8 
17. Three-year interest rate swap 
18. Five-year interest rate swap 
19. Ten-year interest rate swap  
20. Thirty-year interest rate swap  
21. Fannie Mae fixed rate fifteen-year mortgage 
22. Fannie Mae fixed rate thirty-year mortgage 
23. Freddie Mac fixed rate fifteen-year mortgage 
24. Freddie Mac fixed rate thirty-year mortgage 
 
3.3.  Event-Study Methodology 
An event-study is conducted to measure the impact of QE announcements on 
the returns of different financial assets, following the literature including Bernanke, 
Reinhart, & Sack (2004), Gagnon et al (2010) and Krishnamurthy & Vissing-
Jorgensen (2011).  However, unlike Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) 
who used OLS with robust standard error for their event study, this paper uses the 
Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) estimator as in Wang, Yang, Wu (2006), 
since the SUR estimator is considered more efficient as compared to OLS. This is 
because the errors between the financial assets examined in this paper are likely to 
be contemporaneously correlated. Adopting an alternative approach to time-series 
analysis, the event-study approach examines changes in asset yields around official 
communications regarding quantitative easing, while using the cumulative changes 
as a measure of the overall effects. The dates selected for this study include only 
official Fed announcements, each disclosing new information regarding the 
potential or actual expansion of the size, composition, duration of the quantitative 
easing. 
 
8International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA®) mid-market par swap rates. Rates are for 
a Fixed Rate Payer in return for receiving three month LIBOR, and are based on rates collected at 
11:00 a.m. Eastern time by Thomson Reuters and published on Thomson Reuters Page ISDAFIX®1. 
ISDAFIX is a registered service mark of ISDA®. Source: Thomson Reuters. 
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Using seemingly unrelated regression method, the responses of asset 
returns/yields are considered using both 1-day and 2-day event windows around the 
announcements, measured from the closing level the day prior to the announcement 
to the closing level the day after the announcement. The reason for using a 2-day 
event-window instead of a 1-day event window is due to the challenge of 
conducting an event-study during a time of significant turmoil in financial markets, 
especially during the time span of the first quantitative easing, from the fall of 2008 
to the spring of 2009.  During this period, the prices of assets such as corporate 
bonds and CDSs may react slowly to Fed announcements due to lower liquidity 
versus other higher liquid assets such as Treasuries. Krishnamurthy & Vissing-
Jorgensen (2011) deal with this issue by presenting 2-day windows for all assets.  
They find that for assets that are less liquid, the changes in 2-day windows are 
almost always larger than the 1-day changes. And for the higher liquid assets such 
as Treasuries, 2-day changes are almost the same as 1-day changes.  For this paper, 
regressions for event windows of both one day and two days are performed and 
reported, since my paper spans a wider time frame, and financial markets have 
since been more stable after the crisis period. 
The data set includes a zero-one dummy variable 𝐷𝜏 ,𝑡 in the return equation 
rather than modeling abnormal return as prediction errors from the market model 
equation, thus parameterizes the abnormal return in the market model regression 
equation [Binder (1998)].  The system of equations with one equation for each of 
the N assets experiencing the announcement dates from 𝑡1  to A. The system 
comprises twenty-four regression equations: 
 
𝑅𝑁,𝑡 = 𝛾𝑁 ,𝜏𝐷𝜏,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑁,𝑡𝑁 = 1,… , 24 𝑎𝑛𝑑𝜏 = 𝑡1 , 𝑡2  
 
Each equation represents each asset examined in this paper, with a total of N = 
24 assets, where 𝑅𝑁,𝑡 is the intraday return/yield for each asset, with a time frame 
from October 1, 2008 to August 31, 2014.  Additionally, 𝐷𝜏 ,𝑡  is a dummy variable, 
which assumes the value of one on event day 𝑡 = 𝜏 and zero otherwise, where 
𝜏 = 𝑡1, 𝑡2 ,…𝐴 (and 𝜏 = 𝑡1, 𝑡1 + 1,…𝐴,𝐴 + 1 if a two-day event window is used).  
The assumption is that error terms are independent across time, but may have cross 
equation contemporaneous correlations. This method has been suggested by Jaffe 
(1974), Brown & Warner (1980; 1985), and Pynnönen (2005). 
In the hypothesis testing under SUR, whether the impacts of quantitative easing 
announcement has an impact on the various financial assets is examined by testing 
the null of 𝛾1,𝜏 = 𝛾2,𝜏 = ⋯ = 𝛾𝑁,𝜏 = 0. The dummy variables are the 
announcement dates for the three rounds of QE, plus the two rounds of Operation 
Twist. 
 
4. Empirical Results  
Tables 2 and 3 summarize the one-day and two-day return/yield changes (in 
basis points) for stocks, currencies, and treasuries. The more notable changes are 
for the stock and currency markets for QE1, especially on December 1, 2008 – the 
day former Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke gave a speech on the Fed’s intent to 
stabilize the financial markets. Table 3 summarizes the one-day and two-day yield 
changes (in basis points) for corporate bonds, interest rate swaps, and MBSs. The 
more notable changes are for the MBSs, particularly for QE1 announcements. 
Tables 4 – 7 report regression results in this study, together with hypothesis 
tests of whether the different rounds of QE have the same effect on asset 
returns/yields.  First, baseline one-day and two-day event windows regressions are 
performed following QE1 and QE2 dates used by Krishnamurthy & Vissing-
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Jorgensen (2011). Those regressions show that QE1 has a larger impact on 
financial assets than QE2. Additionally, all the coefficients have the expected 
signs.  For instance, QE1 had a positive effect on stocks, lowered yields on fixed 
income assets, and depreciated the dollar against other major currencies.  However, 
this regression includes only certain select announcement dates, and does not tell 
the complete story of the effects of the Fed’s unconventional monetary policy on 
financial market.  Therefore, robustness check regressions are also performed for 
one-day and two-day events, using more official FOMC press release dates on 
these large-scale asset purchases.  Additionally, F-tests are also performed for all of 
these regressions on whether all these events have the same effects on financial 
asset returns or yields. 
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Table 2. Equity, Currency, and Treasuries One-day and Two-day Return/Yield Changes (in basis points) 
Announcement 
Dates 
Change SPY MDY IWM GDL $/EUR $/GBP $/YEN $/CHF 1Y  
T-Bill 
3Y  
T-Note 
5Y 
T-Note 
10Y 
T-Note 
30Y  
T-Bond 
11/25/2008 (QE1) 1-day 74 108 166 -5 86 190 222 82 0 -12 -18 -24 -15 
 2-day 463 756 775 -66 -56 94 175 -94 -2 -15 -23 -36 -24 
12/1/2008 (QE1) 1-day -886 -1026 -1124 -580 -63 -321 249 62 -9 -11 -22 -21 -23 
 2-day -535 -629 -657 -418 18 -297 252 62 -13 -15 -28 -25 -27 
12/16/2009 (QE1) 1-day 471 630 650 225 229 180 179 312 -5 -14 -16 -16 -12 
 2-day 369 701 747 343 535 150 393 814 -5 -4 -15 -33 -32 
1/28/2009 (QE1) 1-day 338 386 412 -109 5 84 -149 -77 1 7 11 12 18 
 2-day 2 41 4 127 -157 122 -116 -94 4 19 28 28 31 
3/18/2009 (QE1) 1-day 224 328 346 339 353 170 248 359 -9 -31 -46 -51 -26 
 2-day 97 246 237 479 499 334 431 526 -9 -24 -36 -41 -21 
8/10/2010 (QE2) 1-day -55 118 -188 28 -34 -25 58 7 -1 -3 -8 -7 -1 
 2-day -327 -459 -574 -5 -272 -147 71 -103 -1 -3 -10 -14 -8 
9/21/2010 (QE2) 1-day -20 55 -59 91 155 50 70 86 0 -5 -9 -11 -8 
 2-day -69 -136 -176 107 264 77 141 191 -1 -5 -10 -16 -13 
11/3/2010 (QE2) 1-day 40 32 39 -69 85 25 -57 90 0 -2 -4 4 16 
 2-day 233 217 293 267 123 142 -15 220 -1 -6 -11 -10 11 
9/13/2012 (QE3) 1-day 152 99 131 202 71 30 47 21 -1 -1 -5 -2 3 
 2-day 197 210 226 231 178 68 -69 113 0 2 2 11 17 
9/18/2013 (QE3) 1-day 22 18 55 12 -4 45 17 10 0 0 -1 -2 -1 
 2-day 80 75 77 -96 26 58 49 35 0 -7 -7 -4 2 
5/22/2013 
(Tapering) 
1-day -74 -170 -146 -71 -37 -69 -66 -85 -1 2 7 9 7 
 2-day -103 -180 -134 130 22 -31 45 14 0 3 7 8 6 
12/18/2013 
(Tapering) 
1-day 171 125 137 -88 -60 78 -154 -10 -1 -1 3 4 2 
 2-day 159 41 62 -323 -78 65 -151 -145 -1 5 11 9 3 
9/21/2011 (OT1) 1-day -295 -354 -370 -125 -94 -151 0 -137 2 7 3 -7 -17 
 2-day -608 -701 -639 -383 -173 -250 28 -231 1 4 -6 -23 -42 
6/20/2012 (OT2) 1-day -16 -7 -15 -76 17 -4 -76 15 2 2 3 1 -1 
 2-day -240 -269 -258 -327 -114 -85 -167 -114 1 2 2 -1 -5 
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Table 3. Corporate Bond, Swaps9 and MBS One-day and Two-day Yield Changes (in basis points) 
Announcement Dates Change Corp 
Aaa 
Corp 
Baa 
1Y 
Swap 
3Y 
Swap 
5Y 
Swap 
10Y 
Swap 
30Y 
Swap 
15Y 
Fannie 
Mae 
30Y 
Fannie 
Mae 
15Y 
Freddie 
Mac 
30Y 
Freddie 
Mac 
11/25/2008 (QE1) 1-day -17 -9 -15 -25 -29 -33 -25 -28 -45 -38 -43 
 2-day -20 -16 -9 -21 -26 -32 -23 -54 -67 -64 -74 
12/1/2008 (QE1) 1-day -25 -19 -8 -15 -18 -17 -18 -32 -12 -27 -18 
 2-day -28 -24 -14 -22 -28 -24 -23 -21 -24 -2 -8 
12/16/2009 (QE1) 1-day -13 -15 -5 -7 -5 -4 -4 -11 -28 -22 -25 
 2-day -35 -41 -35 -41 -49 -54 -43 -24 -24 -15 -23 
1/28/2009 (QE1) 1-day 15 14 -6 -7 -8 -9 -11 -7 -7 -7 -16 
 2-day 27 22 -5 -2 1 5 6 22 42 21 46 
3/18/2009 (QE1) 1-day -24 -23 0 3 5 6 10 -22 -15 -24 -16 
 2-day -20 -17 -18 -25 -31 35 17 16 -31 -14 -31 
8/10/2010 (QE2) 1-day 2 3 0 3 2 0 -4 -5 -1 -2 -3 
 2-day -9 -6 -4 -7 -11 -13 -10 -11 -1 -9 -2 
9/21/2010 (QE2) 1-day -2 -8 -1 -4 -6 -6 -5 -12 -11 -12 -7 
 2-day -10 -13 -4 -11 -17 -19 -16 -9 -12 -10 -4 
11/3/2010 (QE2) 1-day 12 12 -2 -2 -4 -8 -8 -6 -2 -4 -5 
 2-day 9 6 -3 -7 -14 -11 1 -11 -7 -12 -11 
9/13/2012 (QE3) 1-day 3 1 -1 -2 -3 -2 0 -16 -24 -19 -23 
 2-day 11 8 -1 -1 1 8 16 -12 -13 -13 -13 
9/18/2013 (QE3) 1-day 0 1 0 2 2 2 1 -2 -2 -2 -3 
 2-day 3 3 -2 -8 -11 -8 -3 -5 -7 -5 -6 
5/22/2013 (Tapering) 1-day 6 6 0 0 0 1 2 9 10 8 10 
 2-day 5 4 1 3 5 7 5 18 15 18 13 
12/18/2013 (Tapering) 1-day 0 4 -1 -1 1 2 2 5 7 6 8 
 2-day -6 1 2 5 10 7 2 8 9 8 10 
9/21/2011 (OT1) 1-day -1 -16 -2 -3 -3 -4 -2 -1 -25 -7 -25 
 2-day -21 -26 4 2 -5 -19 -32 -20 -38 -16 -13 
6/20/2012 (OT2) 1-day -3 -2 -2 0 1 4 7 5 7 6 7 
 2-day -6 -7 1 3 2 -1 -1 -1 2 0 2 
 
9International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA®) mid-market par swap rates. Rates are for a Fixed Rate Payer in return for receiving three month LIBOR, and are based on 
rates collected at 11:00 a.m. Eastern time by Thomson Reuters and published on Thomson Reuters Page ISDAFIX®1. ISDAFIX is a registered service mark of ISDA®. Source: 
Thomson Reuters. 
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4.1. Baseline One-Day and Two-Day Event Windows Regressions 
Table 4 Panels A and B summarized baseline regression results for 1-day event 
window for all quantitative easing and Operation Twist announcements from 
October 1, 2008 to August 31, 2014, using the same QE1 and QE2 dates as 
Krishnamurthy & Vissing-Jorgensen (2011).  According to regression results, QE1 
had the largest impact on equities, fixed income assets, and currencies.  One 
notable result is for Operation Twist round one, that it had enormous negative 
impacts, especially on equities. This was mostly due to investors disappointed by 
the amount of purchase for OT1. Additionally, OT1 and OT2 had the intended 
effects of increasing short-term treasury yields and decreasing long-term treasury 
yields, thereby ―twisting‖ the yield curve. While one-day event window hypothesis 
tests are significant for fixed income assets, two-day event windows are significant 
for most of assets in this study. 
Table 5 Panels A and B report the two-day event window regressions, and they 
have similar results as one-day results. According to both of these results, QE1 has 
much larger and statistically significant results vs. QE2 and QE3. The overall effect 
of tapering is still debatable, even though current literature believes that tapering is 
damaging to financial markets.  However, regression results so far do not support 
that, as it is still an ongoing process and a more appropriate study needs to be done 
after it ends.  Moreover, the first round of Operation Twist had notable effects on 
the equity market, and the intended result of ―twisting‖ the yield curve. 
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Table 4 Panel A.Baseline Regression with 1-day Event Window 
 
SPY MDY IWM GLD EUR GBP YEN CHF 1Y T-Bill 3Y T-Note 5Y T-Note 
10Y T-
Note 
30Y T-
Bond 
QE1 -0.0573 0.181 0.198 -1.210* 0.649* 0.336 1.250*** 0.936** 
-
0.0315*** 
-
0.0744*** -0.112*** -0.122*** -0.0794** 
 
(0.730) (0.854) (0.907) (0.633) (0.341) (0.326) (0.350) (0.371) (0.0115) (0.0229) (0.0298) (0.0319) (0.0310) 
QE2 -0.167 -0.538 -0.753 0.130 0.660* 0.170 0.232 0.600 -0.00231 -0.0327 -0.0695** -0.0461 0.0240 
 
(0.842) (0.985) (1.047) (0.730) (0.393) (0.376) (0.404) (0.429) (0.0133) (0.0264) (0.0344) (0.0369) (0.0358) 
QE3 -0.0431 -0.251 -0.430 0.344 0.295 0.173 -0.177 0.326 -0.00297 -0.00639 -0.00850 0.000614 0.0106 
 
(0.462) (0.541) (0.575) (0.401) (0.216) (0.206) (0.222) (0.235) (0.00729) (0.0145) (0.0189) (0.0202) (0.0197) 
Tapering 0.0232 -0.189 -0.125 -0.430 -0.151 -0.00413 -0.351 -0.274 0.00103 0.0135 0.0262 0.0235 0.0192 
 
(0.552) (0.646) (0.687) (0.479) (0.258) (0.246) (0.265) (0.281) (0.00870) (0.0173) (0.0226) (0.0242) (0.0235) 
OT1 -2.996** -3.603** -3.763** -1.283 -0.936 -1.502** -0.00305 -1.380* 0.0210 0.0706 0.0305 -0.0694 -0.169*** 
 
(1.458) (1.705) (1.813) (1.264) (0.681) (0.650) (0.700) (0.742) (0.0230) (0.0457) (0.0596) (0.0638) (0.0620) 
OT2 -0.213 -0.137 -0.214 -0.794 0.179 -0.0409 -0.761 0.139 0.0210 0.0206 0.0305 0.0106 -0.00936 
 
(1.458) (1.705) (1.813) (1.264) (0.681) (0.650) (0.700) (0.742) (0.0230) (0.0457) (0.0596) (0.0638) (0.0620) 
Constant 0.0506 0.0669 0.0612 0.0369 -0.00592 -0.00358 0.00305 0.0128 -0.00103* -0.000614 -0.000503 -0.000614 -0.000641 
 
(0.0383) (0.0448) (0.0476) (0.0332) (0.0179) (0.0171) (0.0184) (0.0195) (0.000603) (0.00120) (0.00157) (0.00167) (0.00163) 
No. Obs. 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 
R-squared 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.007 0.005 0.011 0.010 0.006 0.010 0.014 0.012 0.010 
F-stat 3.99 4.17 4.17 5.78 7.93 6.96 16.65*** 12.48** 8.46 14.13** 17.62*** 15.83*** 15.15*** 
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Table 4 Panel B.  Baseline Regression with 1-day Event Window 
 
Corp Aaa Bond Corp Baa Bond 1Y Swap 3Y Swap 5Y Swap 10Y Swap 30Y Swap 
15Y Fannie 
Mae 
30Y Fannie 
Mae 
15Y Freddie 
Mac 
30Y Freddie 
Mac 
QE1 -0.0987*** -0.0704** -0.0833*** -0.134*** -0.149*** -0.157*** -0.144*** -0.159*** -0.194*** -0.149*** -0.173* 
 
(0.0327) (0.0317) (0.0140) (0.0241) (0.0298) (0.0328) (0.0320) (0.0347) (0.0359) (0.0346) (0.0956) 
QE2 0.0413 0.0255 -0.00828 -0.00872 -0.0256 -0.0458 -0.0560 -0.0730* -0.0450 -0.0607 -0.0469 
 
(0.0378) (0.0366) (0.0162) (0.0278) (0.0344) (0.0378) (0.0369) (0.0401) (0.0415) (0.0399) (0.110) 
QE3 0.0113 0.00913 -0.000276 0.00328 0.0161 0.0189 0.0197 -0.0201 -0.0273 -0.0205 -0.0276 
 
(0.0207) (0.0201) (0.00890) (0.0153) (0.0189) (0.0208) (0.0203) (0.0220) (0.0228) (0.0219) (0.0606) 
Tapering 0.0128 0.0207 0.00315 -0.00157 -0.00606 0.000869 0.00354 0.0252 0.0294 0.0237 0.0321 
 
(0.0248) (0.0240) (0.0106) (0.0183) (0.0225) (0.0248) (0.0242) (0.0263) (0.0272) (0.0262) (0.0724) 
OT1 -0.00867 -0.158** -0.0183 -0.0287 -0.0289 -0.0391 -0.0193 -0.103 -0.245*** -0.0663 -0.249 
 
(0.0654) (0.0633) (0.0281) (0.0482) (0.0595) (0.0654) (0.0639) (0.0694) (0.0718) (0.0691) (0.191) 
OT2 -0.0287 -0.0179 -0.0183 0.00128 0.0111 0.0409 0.0707 0.0487 0.0725 0.0603 0.0683 
 
(0.0654) (0.0633) (0.0281) (0.0482) (0.0595) (0.0654) (0.0639) (0.0694) (0.0718) (0.0691) (0.191) 
Constant -0.00133 -0.00213 -0.00172** -0.00128 -0.00108 -0.000869 -0.000683 -0.00131 -0.000868 -0.00143 -0.000954 
 
(0.00172) (0.00166) (0.000737) (0.00127) (0.00156) (0.00172) (0.00168) (0.00182) (0.00188) (0.00181) (0.00501) 
No. Obs. 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 
R-squared 0.007 0.009 0.024 0.021 0.018 0.017 0.017 0.019 0.030 0.016 0.004 
F-stat 10.99* 12.48** 29.58*** 26.01*** 23.17*** 23.09*** 22.88*** 21.89*** 35.82*** 18.91*** 4.51 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5 Panel A.  Baseline Regression with 2-Day Event Window 
 
SPY MDY IWM GLD EUR GBP YEN CHF 1Y T-Bill 3Y T-Note 5Y T-Note 
10Y T-
Note 
30Y T-Bond 
QE1 0.392 1.097** 1.108* 0.431 0.834*** 0.408** 1.126*** 1.185*** -0.0241*** -0.0383*** -0.0735*** -0.107*** -0.0727*** 
 
(0.461) (0.539) (0.574) (0.400) (0.215) (0.206) (0.221) (0.234) (0.00728) (0.0145) (0.0189) (0.0201) (0.0195) 
QE2 -0.330 -0.707 -0.838 0.580 0.194 0.122 0.326 0.501* -0.00408 -0.0227 -0.0512** -0.0664** -0.0163 
 
(0.595) (0.695) (0.740) (0.516) (0.278) (0.265) (0.284) (0.301) (0.00939) (0.0187) (0.0244) (0.0259) (0.0251) 
QE3 -0.142 -0.141 -0.239 -0.216 0.0214 0.102 -0.400** 0.0762 -7.88e-05 0.00565 0.0170 0.0253* 0.0243* 
 
(0.327) (0.382) (0.407) (0.284) (0.153) (0.146) (0.156) (0.166) (0.00517) (0.0103) (0.0134) (0.0142) (0.0138) 
Tapering -0.0619 -0.212 -0.181 -0.288 -0.123 -0.0152 -0.138 -0.173 -0.00194 0.00923 0.0169 0.0175 0.0118 
 
(0.390) (0.456) (0.485) (0.339) (0.182) (0.174) (0.187) (0.198) (0.00616) (0.0123) (0.0160) (0.0170) (0.0165) 
OT1 -3.144*** -3.637*** -3.309*** -1.969** -0.863* -1.255*** 0.139 -1.170** 0.00592 0.0207 -0.0295 -0.115** -0.210*** 
 
(1.028) (1.202) (1.279) (0.892) (0.480) (0.459) (0.492) (0.521) (0.0162) (0.0324) (0.0421) (0.0447) (0.0435) 
OT2 -1.258 -1.412 -1.354 -1.685* -0.565 -0.419 -0.839* -0.577 0.00592 0.0107 0.0105 -0.00468 -0.0247 
 
(1.028) (1.202) (1.279) (0.892) (0.480) (0.459) (0.492) (0.521) (0.0162) (0.0324) (0.0421) (0.0447) (0.0435) 
Constant 0.0549 0.0673 0.0612 0.0381 -0.00568 -0.00444 0.00224 0.00949 -0.000921 -0.000654 -0.000499 -0.000316 -0.000331 
 
(0.0385) (0.0450) (0.0479) (0.0334) (0.0180) (0.0172) (0.0184) (0.0195) (0.000609) (0.00121) (0.00158) (0.00168) (0.00163) 
No. Obs. 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 
R-squared 0.008 0.011 0.009 0.008 0.014 0.009 0.025 0.024 0.008 0.007 0.015 0.030 0.027 
F-stat 11.13** 15.58*** 12.73** 11.48** 19.55*** 12.50** 37.60*** 32.16*** 8.99 9.46* 21.66*** 41.77*** 39.70*** 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5 Panel B.  Baseline Regression with 2-Day Event Window 
 
Corp Aaa 
Bond 
Corp Baa 
Bond 
1Y Swap 3Y Swap 5Y Swap 10Y Swap 30Y Swap 
15Y Fannie 
Mae 
30Y 
Fannie 
Mae 
15Y Freddie 
Mac 
30Y 
Freddie 
Mac 
QE1 -0.0750*** -0.0742*** -0.0796*** -0.110*** -0.132*** -0.140*** -0.0997*** -0.0913*** -0.102*** -0.0725*** -0.0894 
 
(0.0207) (0.0200) (0.00876) (0.0151) (0.0186) (0.0205) (0.0202) (0.0220) (0.0228) (0.0220) (0.0607) 
QE2 -0.0157 -0.0199 -0.0169 -0.0406** -0.0693*** -0.0713*** -0.0413 -0.0522* -0.0333 -0.0486* -0.0275 
 
(0.0266) (0.0258) (0.0113) (0.0195) (0.0240) (0.0265) (0.0260) (0.0284) (0.0294) (0.0283) (0.0782) 
QE3 0.0255* 0.0233 0.000449 0.00803 0.0212 0.0243* 0.0253* 0.0141 0.0170 0.0179 0.0208 
 
(0.0147) (0.0142) (0.00621) (0.0107) (0.0132) (0.0146) (0.0143) (0.0156) (0.0162) (0.0156) (0.0430) 
Tapering 0.00101 0.00536 0.00359 0.0139 0.0150 0.0118 0.00461 0.0183 0.0191 0.0202 0.0193 
 
(0.0175) (0.0169) (0.00741) (0.0128) (0.0158) (0.0174) (0.0171) (0.0186) (0.0193) (0.0186) (0.0513) 
OT1 -0.104** -0.128*** 0.0214 0.0110 -0.0243 -0.0947** -0.160*** -0.0971** -0.190*** -0.0761 -0.0615 
 
(0.0461) (0.0446) (0.0195) (0.0338) (0.0416) (0.0458) (0.0450) (0.0491) (0.0509) (0.0490) (0.135) 
OT2 -0.0290 -0.0332 0.00645 0.0160 0.0107 -0.00468 -0.00468 -0.00260 0.0123 0.00257 0.0133 
 
(0.0461) (0.0446) (0.0195) (0.0338) (0.0416) (0.0458) (0.0450) (0.0491) (0.0509) (0.0490) (0.135) 
Constant -0.00101 -0.00179 -0.00145** -0.00103 -0.000703 -0.000323 -0.000323 -0.00134 -0.000988 -0.00163 -0.00136 
 
(0.00173) (0.00167) (0.000732) (0.00127) (0.00156) (0.00171) (0.00169) (0.00184) (0.00191) (0.00183) (0.00507) 
Observations 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 
R-squared 0.015 0.017 0.055 0.039 0.041 0.040 0.028 0.017 0.025 0.013 0.002 
F-stat 20.67*** 24.20*** 72.04*** 52.41*** 56.11*** 53.22*** 38.43*** 23.37*** 34.39*** 17.84*** 2.79 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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4.2.  Robustness Check One-Day and Two-Day Event Windows 
Regressions 
A robustness check regression is also performed, which included more QE1 and 
QE2 dates, all of those dates are official press releases by the FOMC that 
Krishnamurthy & Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) omitted.  See Table 1 for the list of 
complete dates in these regressions.  Regression results are reported in Tables 6 – 
7. Robustness check show similar results as the original regressions, with positive 
effects on equity returns with statistically significant results, and negative effects 
on fixed-income yields, also with mostly statistically significant results.  
Hypothesis tests on whether the different rounds of QE have the same effects are 
also performed.  In most cases, the null hypothesis is rejected, thereby affirming 
that different rounds of QEs are different in impact. 
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Table 6. Panel A.  Robustness Check Regression with 1-Day Event Window 
 
SPY MDY IWM GLD EUR GBP YEN CHF 1Y T-Bill 3Y T-Note 5Y T-Note 10Y T-Note 
30Y T-
Bond 
QE1 0.633* 0.865* 0.936* 0.0767 0.583*** 0.452*** 0.368* 0.481** -0.0212*** -0.0438*** -0.0589*** -0.0601*** -0.0278* 
 
(0.391) (0.457) (0.486) (0.340) (0.182) (0.174) (0.189) (0.199) (0.00616) (0.0123) (0.0160) (0.0171) (0.0166) 
QE2 -0.166 -0.183 -0.252 0.171 0.353 -0.00284 0.0931 0.470* -0.000337 0.00424 0.00668 0.0256 0.0445** 
 
(0.516) (0.604) (0.642) (0.449) (0.241) (0.230) (0.249) (0.263) (0.00813) (0.0162) (0.0212) (0.0226) (0.0220) 
QE3 -0.0375 -0.244 -0.421 0.349 0.300 0.176 -0.177 0.329 -0.00309 -0.00651 -0.00857 0.000606 0.0108 
 
(0.462) (0.540) (0.574) (0.401) (0.216) (0.206) (0.223) (0.235) (0.00728) (0.0145) (0.0189) (0.0203) (0.0197) 
Tapering 0.0289 -0.181 -0.116 -0.426 -0.146 -0.00107 -0.351 -0.270 0.000913 0.0133 0.0261 0.0235 0.0194 
 
(0.552) (0.645) (0.686) (0.479) (0.257) (0.246) (0.266) (0.281) (0.00869) (0.0173) (0.0226) (0.0242) (0.0235) 
OT1 -2.991** -3.595** -3.755** -1.278 -0.931 -1.499** -0.00291 -1.376* 0.0209 0.0705 0.0304 -0.0694 -0.169*** 
 
(1.456) (1.703) (1.811) (1.265) (0.680) (0.649) (0.702) (0.742) (0.0229) (0.0457) (0.0597) (0.0639) (0.0620) 
OT2 -0.207 -0.129 -0.205 -0.789 0.184 -0.0379 -0.761 0.142 0.0209 0.0205 0.0304 0.0106 -0.00921 
 
(1.456) (1.703) (1.811) (1.265) (0.680) (0.649) (0.702) (0.742) (0.0229) (0.0457) (0.0597) (0.0639) (0.0620) 
Constant 0.0449 0.0589 0.0526 0.0322 -0.0103 -0.00664 0.00291 0.00936 -0.000913 -0.000488 -0.000425 -0.000606 -0.000787 
 
(0.0384) (0.0450) (0.0478) (0.0334) (0.0179) (0.0171) (0.0185) (0.0196) (0.000605) (0.00121) (0.00158) (0.00169) (0.00164) 
Observations 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 
R-squared 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.002 0.011 0.009 0.005 0.010 0.009 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.010 
F-stat 6.80 8.36 8.75 3.15 8.80 10.42* 7.51 10.44* 10.51* 13.83** 13.22** 14.21** 15.42*** 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6 Panel B.  Robustness Check Regression 1-Day Event Window 
 
Corp Aaa 
Bond 
Corp Baa 
Bond 
1Y Swap 3Y Swap 5Y Swap 10Y Swap 30Y Swap 
15Y Fannie 
Mae 
30Y Fannie 
Mae 
15Y Freddie 
Mac 
30Y 
Freddie 
Mac 
QE1 -0.0457*** -0.0306* -0.0262*** -0.0330** -0.0332** -0.0319* -0.0256 -0.0696*** -0.0671*** -0.0731*** -0.0872* 
 
(0.0175) (0.0170) (0.00759) (0.0130) (0.0161) (0.0177) (0.0173) (0.0187) (0.0194) (0.0186) (0.0513) 
QE2 0.0602*** 0.0523** -0.00581 -0.0112 -0.0201 -0.0266 -0.0254 0.0143 0.0127 0.0269 0.0110 
 
(0.0232) (0.0224) (0.0100) (0.0172) (0.0212) (0.0233) (0.0228) (0.0247) (0.0256) (0.0245) (0.0677) 
QE3 0.0114 0.00926 -0.000314 0.00329 0.0161 0.0189 0.0198 -0.0201 -0.0273 -0.0205 -0.0279 
 
(0.0207) (0.0201) (0.00897) (0.0154) (0.0190) (0.0209) (0.0204) (0.0221) (0.0229) (0.0219) (0.0606) 
Tapering 0.0128 0.0208 0.00311 -0.00157 -0.00603 0.000941 0.00367 0.0252 0.0294 0.0236 0.0319 
 
(0.0247) (0.0240) (0.0107) (0.0184) (0.0227) (0.0249) (0.0244) (0.0264) (0.0273) (0.0262) (0.0724) 
OT1 -0.00859 -0.158** -0.0183 -0.0287 -0.0289 -0.0391 -0.0192 -0.103 -0.245*** -0.0663 -0.249 
 
(0.0653) (0.0633) (0.0283) (0.0486) (0.0599) (0.0659) (0.0644) (0.0696) (0.0722) (0.0692) (0.191) 
OT2 -0.0286 -0.0177 -0.0183 0.00129 0.0111 0.0409 0.0708 0.0487 0.0726 0.0603 0.0681 
 
(0.0653) (0.0633) (0.0283) (0.0486) (0.0599) (0.0659) (0.0644) (0.0696) (0.0722) (0.0692) (0.191) 
Constant -0.00141 -0.00226 -0.00169** -0.00129 -0.00111 -0.000941 -0.000808 -0.00131 -0.000917 -0.00141 -0.000749 
 
(0.00172) (0.00167) (0.000746) (0.00128) (0.00158) (0.00174) (0.00170) (0.00184) (0.00191) (0.00183) (0.00504) 
Observations 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 
R-squared 0.010 0.011 0.009 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.012 0.018 0.013 0.003 
F-stat 14.44** 16.00*** 7.60 4.08 4.40 4.96 5.26 14.35** 22.04*** 16.52*** 3.93 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7 Panel A.  Robustness Check Regression with 2-Day Event Window 
 
SPY MDY IWM GLD EUR GBP YEN CHF 1Y T-Bill 3Y T-Note 5Y T-Note 10Y T-Note 
30Y T-
Bond 
QE1 0.490* 0.829** 0.844** 0.0578 0.295** 0.244** 0.274** 0.339** -0.0149*** -0.0268*** -0.0369*** -0.0418*** -0.0264** 
 
(0.277) (0.324) (0.345) (0.241) (0.130) (0.124) (0.134) (0.142) (0.00438) (0.00873) (0.0114) (0.0122) (0.0118) 
QE2 -0.319 -0.339 -0.325 -0.0481 -0.0163 -0.126 0.141 0.293 -0.00360 -0.0159 -0.0222 -0.0178 0.00292 
 
(0.365) (0.427) (0.454) (0.317) (0.171) (0.163) (0.176) (0.186) (0.00577) (0.0115) (0.0150) (0.0160) (0.0155) 
QE3 -0.138 -0.133 -0.230 -0.221 0.0204 0.102 -0.403** 0.0758 -0.000225 0.00532 0.0168 0.0253* 0.0244* 
 
(0.327) (0.382) (0.407) (0.284) (0.153) (0.146) (0.158) (0.167) (0.00517) (0.0103) (0.0134) (0.0143) (0.0139) 
Tapering -0.0573 -0.205 -0.172 -0.293 -0.124 -0.0151 -0.140 -0.174 -0.00208 0.00889 0.0167 0.0175 0.0119 
 
(0.390) (0.456) (0.485) (0.339) (0.183) (0.174) (0.188) (0.199) (0.00616) (0.0123) (0.0160) (0.0171) (0.0165) 
OT1 -3.139*** -3.630*** -3.300*** -1.974** -0.864* -1.255*** 0.137 -1.170** 0.00577 0.0203 -0.0297 -0.115** -0.210*** 
 
(1.027) (1.201) (1.278) (0.893) (0.482) (0.459) (0.495) (0.525) (0.0162) (0.0324) (0.0422) (0.0450) (0.0436) 
OT2 -1.253 -1.405 -1.345 -1.689* -0.566 -0.419 -0.841* -0.577 0.00577 0.0103 0.0103 -0.00468 -0.0246 
 
(1.027) (1.201) (1.278) (0.893) (0.482) (0.459) (0.495) (0.525) (0.0162) (0.0324) (0.0422) (0.0450) (0.0436) 
Constant 0.0503 0.0596 0.0526 0.0430 -0.00462 -0.00445 0.00454 0.00996 -0.000775 -0.000316 -0.000258 -0.000323 -0.000423 
 
(0.0389) (0.0455) (0.0484) (0.0338) (0.0182) (0.0174) (0.0188) (0.0199) (0.000615) (0.00123) (0.00160) (0.00171) (0.00165) 
Observations 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 
R-squared 0.010 0.012 0.010 0.007 0.007 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.008 0.009 0.011 0.016 0.021 
F-stat 14.93* 18.14*** 14.84** 8.20 9.95* 13.07** 15.00** 13.40** 7.15 9.89* 13.62** 21.37*** 31.48*** 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7 Panel B.  Robustness Check Regression with 2-Day Event Window 
 
Corp Aaa 
Bond 
Corp Baa 
Bond 
1Y Swap 3Y Swap 5Y Swap 10Y Swap 30Y Swap 
15Y Fannie 
Mae 
30Y Fannie 
Mae 
15Y Freddie 
Mac 
30Y 
Freddie 
Mac 
QE1 -0.0366*** -0.0339*** -0.0377*** -0.0452*** -0.0491*** -0.0490*** -0.0321*** -0.0476*** -0.0523*** -0.0444*** -0.0587 
 
(0.0125) (0.0121) (0.00533) (0.00920) (0.0113) (0.0125) (0.0122) (0.0133) (0.0138) (0.0132) (0.0365) 
QE2 0.00342 0.00301 -0.00623 -0.0229* -0.0351** -0.0316* -0.0171 -0.00985 -0.00281 -0.00687 -0.000196 
 
(0.0164) (0.0159) (0.00702) (0.0121) (0.0149) (0.0164) (0.0161) (0.0175) (0.0181) (0.0174) (0.0481) 
QE3 0.0254* 0.0233 0.000270 0.00783 0.0211 0.0243* 0.0254* 0.0139 0.0168 0.0176 0.0204 
 
(0.0147) (0.0142) (0.00628) (0.0109) (0.0134) (0.0147) (0.0144) (0.0157) (0.0162) (0.0156) (0.0430) 
Tapering 0.000918 0.00534 0.00341 0.0137 0.0149 0.0117 0.00466 0.0181 0.0189 0.0200 0.0188 
 
(0.0175) (0.0170) (0.00749) (0.0129) (0.0160) (0.0176) (0.0172) (0.0187) (0.0194) (0.0186) (0.0513) 
OT1 -0.104** -0.128*** 0.0213 0.0108 -0.0244 -0.0947** -0.160*** -0.0973** -0.191*** -0.0764 -0.0619 
 
(0.0462) (0.0447) (0.0197) (0.0341) (0.0420) (0.0463) (0.0452) (0.0492) (0.0510) (0.0490) (0.135) 
OT2 -0.0291 -0.0332 0.00627 0.0158 0.0106 -0.00471 -0.00463 -0.00279 0.0121 0.00233 0.0129 
 
(0.0462) (0.0447) (0.0197) (0.0341) (0.0420) (0.0463) (0.0452) (0.0492) (0.0510) (0.0490) (0.135) 
Constant -0.000918 -0.00176 -0.00127* -0.000832 -0.000567 -0.000287 -0.000373 -0.00116 -0.000790 -0.00140 -0.000949 
 
(0.00175) (0.00169) (0.000747) (0.00129) (0.00159) (0.00175) (0.00171) (0.00186) (0.00193) (0.00185) (0.00512) 
Observations 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 
R-squared 0.012 0.013 0.034 0.020 0.019 0.018 0.016 0.013 0.020 0.011 0.002 
F-stat 15.91*** 18.30*** 36.14*** 22.30*** 22.32*** 21.06*** 21.34*** 15.71*** 27.10*** 14.64*** 2.84 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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5. Concluding Remarks 
This study is a complete and thorough study on the effects of LSAPs since the 
financial crisis of 2008 on all sectors of the financial market.  All of the major 
equity and fixed income assets are included in this study, as well as major currency 
pairs against the U.S. dollar. The large scale purchases included in this study are 
the three rounds of quantitative easing, with the third round in the process of 
tapering, and the two rounds of operation twist.  An event study approach is taken, 
similar to other research papers on quantitative easing. 
Empirical results show that the three rounds of QE decreased yield on all long-
term nominal assets, including Treasuries, Agency bonds, corporate bonds, and 
MBS. This was the intention of the Fed since it announced the first round of these 
large-scale asset purchases in 2008. Additionally, the effects of QE are larger for 
longer duration assets, another intended goal set out by the Fed. Evidence shows 
that the first round of QE was the most effective.  While the second and third 
rounds of quantitative easing also had intended effects on most of the assets 
examined in this paper, the first round of quantitative easing had a larger effect, 
with results statistically significant.   
Moreover, QE also affected other financial assets, as evidenced by the increase 
in the return of equity markets over the announcement periods. Lastly, QE 
depreciated the home currency against other major currencies. 
While the first quantitative easing had the intended effects of lowering the cost 
and increasing the availability of credit for the purchase of houses, which in turn 
should support housing markets and foster improved conditions in financial 
markets more generally, the impacts of subsequent rounds of quantitative easing, as 
well as Operation Twists, are minimal. This opens up the debate of whether the Fed 
should discontinue its asset purchases, instead of its current action of merely 
tapering off QE. 
Evidence of the Fed’s actions affecting other financial markets besides the 
intended bond market should alert policy-makers to device more prudent 
unconventional monetary policy in the future, since the Fed’s QE actions could 
have caused the current stock market bubble. 
At the time of this chapter’s writing, the Fed’s large-scale asset purchase is still 
ongoing, albeit at a reduced rate of $10 billion per month for agency MBS, and $20 
billion per month for long-term Treasury securities
10
. A possible research 
suggestion in the future is to conduct a comprehensive study of the conclusion of 
the Fed’s asset purchasing program using the same methodology as in this study. 
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